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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
P1a int i f f-Re spondent,
No. 14135

vs.
PETER FOUKAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action arising out of appellant's alleged
traffic violation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was, upon stipulated facts, taken under
advisement by the Court. From a judgment of guilty, the
defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was observed by an officer of the Utah
State Highway Patrol on April 27, 1974, driving on a highway
with a posted speed limit of 55 M.P.H. in Davis County.
The officer clocked appellant's speed to exceed the posted
speed limit, stopped the appellant's vehicle, and issued a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

traffic citation for driving at 60 M.P.H.
In January, 1974, pursuant to the Emergency Highway
Energy Conservation Act, the Governor of the State of Utah
declared by proclamation; and the Utah State Road Commission
adopted by resolution a maximum speed limit on highways
throughout the State of Utah of 55 M.P.H.

Prior to January,

1974, the posted speed limit on the highway in question was
65 M.P.H.
ISSUES
1.

Was the reduced maximum speed limit on the highway

in question properly established?
2.

Was a valid maximum speed limit of 55 M.P.H.

created?
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE GOVERNORfS PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING A
MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT ON HIGHWAYS WITHIN UTAH
OF 55 M.P.H. WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953) § 41-6-46(4) AND THUS IS
VOID.

The Governor of the State of Utah is granted the
authority to reduce tha maximum speed limit by the terms
set forth in Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-46(4):
"(4) Provided, that the governor by proclamation,
in time of war or national emergency, may upon
recommendation of the federal authorities, change
the speed on the highways of the state, to conform
to such recommendations.
However, the language of the statute clearly indicates
that a two-pronged test must be met in order for the Governor
to act by changing the speed limit.

First, federal authorities
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must recommend a change in the speed limit.

Second, there

must be a national emergency (we are not here concerned
with the statutory clause referring to time of war).
The Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, H. R.
11372, Public Law 93-239,87 Statute 1046 (January 2, 1974,
93rd Congress, 1st Session) was passed for the purpose of
conserving fuel during periods of current and imminent
shortages of fuel through the establishment of a national
maximum highway speed limit. The language of this Act
appears to satisfy the first prong of the test, in that
federal authorities were recommending a change in the speed
limit.

However, it may be significant to note that states

not following the "recommendation" by adopting the proposed
speed limit would suffer a loss of federal revenues in those
programs involving state highway systems. In this sense, the
Act has more of the character of an extortionate command
than a recommendation.
In the Governor's Proclamation declaring a reduction
in the maximum speed limit, it recites the declared existence
of conditions which constitute a national emergency in
regard to motor vehicle fuel.

However, it does not appear

just where and when such a national emergency was declared,
if in fact it ever was, nor has Respondent substantiated
in his pleadings the otherwise conclusory allegation of the
Governor. Neither does the language of the Emergency Highway
Energy Conservation act refer to the existence of any
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national emergency other than the usage of the word "Emergency"
in the title of the Act.
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-46(4) offers little
guidance in determining what constitutes a time of national
emergency sufficient to warrant a reduction of the maximum
speed limit by the Governor.

The statute does not recite

that a national emergency must be formally declared.

However,

it is relevant to note that in the related area of emergency
situations, i.e., flood, earthquake, etc., a state of
emergency must be declared for the stricken area to quality
for emergency assistance funding.

On the other hand, the

spirit of the statute surely would not permit the Governor
to take action based on a declaration of national emergency
when in fact there was no national emergency.

According

to Respondent, the Utah Legislature left it up to the Governor
to decide what (presumably) constitutes a national emergency
(Plaintiff's Reply Brief, page 2 refers to an emergency in
Utah), and that he declared such an emergency.

This standard

is manifestatively unreasonable, as it differs little from
the situation noted above in which a non-existent national
emergency is declared.

It is unrealistic to assume that

the state legislature granted the unfettered discretion to
the Governor to determine just what it is that constitutes
a national emergency.

Appellant submits that the most

appropriate and reasonable criteria for determining what
constitutes a time of national emergency is whether such
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an emergency actually exists, not whether one has been
declared.

Appellant further submits that the so-called

"energy crisis" presented at the time of the Governor's
Proclamation and Appellant's speeding citation was insufficient basis to constitute the existence of a national
emergency.

Thus the second prong of the test was not met

for purposes of invoking the authority of Utah Code Annotated,
§ 41-6-46(4).

Therefore, the maximum speed limit reduction

on Utah's highways to 55 M.P.H. cannot be validly based on
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-4 6(4) or the Governor's Proclamation
under said statute.
POINT II: THE RESOLUTION BY THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION
ADOPTING A MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT ON HIGHWAYS
WITHIN UTAH OF 55 M.P.H. WAS NOT AUTHORIZED
BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) §§ 27-12-121 AND
41-6-47 AND THUS IS VOID.
The Utah State Road Commission's Resolution relies on
three factors used to justify adoption of a reduced maximum
speed limit.

The first two, namely the Emergency Highway

Energy Conservation Act and the Governor's Proclamation,
are not valid justifications for reasons discussed in Point
I.

Thus the sole basis set forth in the resolution for

the adoption is the statutory provision Utah Code Annotated,
§ 27-12-121 which authorizes the State Road Commission
...to do all other things necessary fully
to carry out the cooperation contemplated
and provided for by...
the provisions of Title 23, United States Code Annotated,
relating to federal aid for highway purposes, together with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. This
statute, it is argued by Respondent, grants blanket authority
to the State Road Commission to change the maximum speed
limit necessary in order for the state to remain qualified
for the receipt of federal monies for highway purposes.
While the general provisions of Utah Code Annotated,
§ 27-12-121 seem to authorize a reduction of the maximum
speed limit, the Utah State Legislature has specifically
designated the standard by which the State Road Commission
must meet in order to change the prima facie speed limit.
The provision, Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-47, provides
as follows:
PRIMA FACIE LIMIT - Whenever the State Road
Commission shall determine on the basis of an
engineering and traffic investigation that
any prima facie speed hereinbefore set forth
is greater or less than is reasonable or safe
under the conditions found to exist...upon
any part of a state highway, said commission
may determine and declare a reasonable and safe
prima facie speed limit thereat which shall be
effective when appropriate signs giving notice
thereof are erected at such...part of the
highway (emphasis added).
It is clearly apparent that the State Road Commission,
in its resolution reducing the maximum speed limit, did not
meet this standard for making such a change as is indicated
in the language of Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-47.
Appellant submits that Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-4 7
is

specific and maintains controlling precedence over

Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-121, in limiting what the State
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Road Commission can do about highway speed, the latter
statute having more of a general character. Thus it is
contended that the State Road Commission misplaced its
reliance on Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-121 as a proper
basis for the resolution adopting a maximum speed limit
of 55 M.P.H. Therefore, the State Road Commission has
wrongly exceeded the statutory guidelines and scope of
authority granted to it pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§ 41-6-47.
POINT III. THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953)
§ 27-12-121 AS APPLIED BY THE STATE ROAD
COMMISSION IN ITS RESOLUTION ADOPTING A
MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT ON HIGHWAYS WITHIN UTAH
OF 55 M.P.H. ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
AND INDEFINITE, RENDERING SAID RESOLUTION
VOID,
Point III is asserted in the alternative, should this
Court determine that the Resolution of the State Road Commission in question was authorized by Utah Code Annotated,
§ 27-12-121. Referring to the language of said statute as
set forth in Point II, and the interpretation of the language
as contended by Respondent, it apparently grants to the
State Road Commission the power to do virtually anything.
Upon a careful examination and reading of Utah Code Annotated,
§ 27-12-121, in its entirety (the validity of the remainder
of the statute being not in issue here), it can be reasonably
interpreted that the Utah State Legislature may have reserved
the authority in itself to take action similar to the
Resolution of the State Highway Commission, However, it
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cannot be reasonably asserted that such authority was granted
to the State Highway Commission beyond the unclear dimensions
of "to do all other things necessary fully."

The last two

words quoted suggest that some unintended error may have
occurred in the formulation of the statute. Regardless,
whatever standard is intended by the language of Utah Code
Annotated, § 27-12-121 is vague and indefinite. Appellant
asserts that the quality of such standard set by the statutory
language renders it unconstitutional for purposes which
Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-121 has been applied in the
instant case.

Such unconstitutionality, in turn, voids

the Resolution of the State Road Commission adopting a
maximum speed limit of 55 M.P.H.
In its response to this contention, Respondent asserts
the statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and has
cited case law rejecting a contention that the wording of
a statute in question constituted an unconstitutional
delegation of the legislative function.

This latter argument

is not in issue in the instant case, and though it is
conceded that statutes are presumed constitutional, this
is really beside the point, since the presumption is
rebuttable. Appellant's argument is that Utah Code Annotated,
§ 27-12-121 is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, and
not that it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of
authority.

Further, it is argued that, under the facts

-8-
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and circumstances of this case, the presumption of statutory
constitutionality should be considered overcome.

In this

regard, Point III should be read in conjunction with Point
II, since it is also argued that Utah Code Annotated,
§ 27-12-121 does not authorize the Resolution adopted by
the State Road Commission.
CONCLUSION
Briefly to reiterate, the position of Appellant is
that the means of reducing the maximum speed limit on highways in Utah, namely the Governor's Proclamation and the
State Road Commission's Resolution, were not authorized by
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §§§ 41-6-46(4), 41-6-47, and
27-12-121.

In the alternative, it is asserted that Utah

Code Annotated, § 27-12-121 is unconstitutional as applied
to this case. Either way, the reduction of the maximum
speed limit in Utah was improper. Therefore, Appellant
could not be validly cited for driving at 60 M.P.H. on a
highway which had a maximum speed limit of 65 M.P.H., the
limit in force at the time of the Governor's Proclamation
and the State Road Commission's Resolution.

Thus, the

judgment of guilty must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorney for Appellant
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